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International sports organizations as diplomatic 
actors.  
The case of FIFA exerting influence on states1
Abstract: Contemporary diplomacy has evolved into a network involving various 
new actors, including international sports organizations. The article is dedicated to the 
issue of the sports diplomacy of international bodies which are in charge of interna-
tional sporting competitions, particularly the International Federation of Association 
Football (FIFA), an organization that manages football on a global level.
 The research presented in this article is a case study dedicated to the issue of the 
influence of international sports organizations on the governments of sovereign states, 
specifically FIFA. The objective of the research is to investigate whether international 
sports organizations are able to make governments change their political decisions. 
The hypothesis that has been investigated states that international sports governing 
bodies are diplomatic actors capable of influencing states.
Key words: FIFA, sports diplomacy, diplomacy, international sports organizations, 
sport and politics
Introduction
This article is dedicated to the issue of the sports diplomacy of interna-tional sports organizations (ISOs) that are in charge of international 
competition in particular sports. The objective of the research is to inves-
tigate if and how these bodies can exert their influence on governments. 
The research focuses on one of the most important and influential ISOs, 
namely the International Federation of Association Football (French: 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association, FIFA).
Today’s diplomacy is very different from how it was in the past. It 
is believed to be evolving and, as a consequence, hierarchical diploma-
1 This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland [grant number 
2015/19/D/HS5/00513].
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tic forms and processes associated with the state are being replaced by 
network forms and processes that are more inclusive. In some areas tra-
ditional intergovernmental diplomacy has remained the most important, 
but in others non-state actors have gained significance (Hocking, 2016, 
pp. 72–73). Sub-state and regional authorities, international organizations, 
transnational corporations, celebrities and non-governmental organiza-
tions are among the new diplomatic actors (Adler-Nissen, 2016, p. 93). It 
therefore seems salient to speak of international sports organizations such 
as FIFA as diplomatic actors, with their own objectives and capabilities 
to achieve them. This research is therefore based on modernist theoretical 
approaches, such as liberal institutionalism and interdependence libera-
lism, which widen the scope of research beyond the system of states.
This article discusses sports diplomacy which is perceived by many 
authors to be a form of public diplomacy (Johns, 2014, pp. 7–8; Black, 
Peacock, 2013, p. 709) and explained as a way to utilize sport in order to 
achieve international goals (Houlihan, 2004, p. 217; Merkel, 2017, p. 29), 
with states as direct or at least indirect actors. Sports diplomacy can also be 
explained as the activity of international sports organizations affecting their 
relations with governments. According to Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pig-
man (2014, p. 1099), as well as states’ use of sport for diplomatic purposes, 
sports diplomacy is also about diplomatic representation, communication 
and negotiations between non-state actors that are held as a result of inter-
national sport. A similar view on the sports diplomacy of non-state actors 
such as FIFA or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was presen-
ted by Aaron Beacom (2012), who proposed the concept of ‘Olympism as 
diplomacy’ in relation to the IOC and the Olympic Games. Beacom has 
employed the multi-stakeholder diplomacy model to analyze the Olympic 
Games as a diplomatic event in their own right (Beacom, 2012, p. 38).
Apart from theoretical investigations concerning sports diplomacy, 
some of which have been mentioned above, there are very few empiri-
cal studies related to international sports governing bodies as diplomatic 
actors. Most of them focus on the International Olympic Committee, for 
example the book authored by Aaron Beacom (2012) and articles by Verity 
Postlethwaite and Jonathan Grix (2016) or by Steve Jackson and Marcelle 
Dawson (2017). Among the studies dedicated to FIFA as a diplomatic actor, 
papers by Christiane Eisenberg (2005) or Heidrun Homburg (2006) should 
be mentioned. However, none of the available studies has directly referred 
to the FIFA’s attempts to exert influence on the governments of sovereign 
states. The research presented in the article aims to fill this gap.
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The diplomatic activity of international sports organizations can be 
observed in a number of situations, for example when they select the ho-
sts of sports events under their control, decide to affiliate or not national 
sports federations, or negotiate with other international actors such as sta-
tes. This article focuses on another dimension of ISO diplomacy, which 
is the ability to exert pressure on governments and other state authorities. 
States as sovereign actors have the right to make decisions concerning 
their territories. Nevertheless, in the history of sport there have been many 
cases when ISOs were able to make governments change their prior, so-
vereign decisions. For example, in the 1960s, the International Olympic 
Committee successfully made the French government agree to accept ath-
letes from East Germany on French territory despite their earlier policy 
(IOC Session, 1964, October 7–9, p. 5, 9–10; Reddihan, 2017, p. 199). 
This research aims to investigate similar attempts made by FIFA.
Method and hypothesis
The research presented in the article is a case study. It refers to the 
issue of international non-governmental organizations and their diploma-
tic activity, which can be recognized in a number of ways which have 
been listed above. Exerting pressure on states, by which we understand 
attempts to influence the policies of the governments of sovereign states, 
is one of them. This research is dedicated to this particular form of diplo-
matic activity among ISOs. This phenomenon has been investigated using 
the example of FIFA, which is regarded as one of the most important 
and powerful international sports organizations, both economically and 
politically, mostly because of the global popularity of football. Therefore, 
a number of situations in which FIFA attempted to make governments 
change their earlier political decisions will be considered. Within the case 
study, process tracing has been used to determine the reasons why go-
vernments may comply with the requests or demands of ISOs.
The first research question that the article attempts to answer is whe-
ther international sports organizations are able to make governments 
change their political decisions. Another research question focuses on the 
reasons why sovereign states comply with the requests by non-govern-
mental organizations. The hypothesis to be tested states that international 
sports governing bodies are diplomatic actors capable of exerting influ-
ence on states. This hypothesis will be tested using the smoking-gun test 
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(Gałganek, 2018, pp. 16–17), since the observation of effective attempts 
to change governments’ decisions supports the conclusion that ISOs are 
capable of exerting influence on states.
In this research, FIFA has been treated as a homogenous body and its 
internal power struggles have been ignored, although it should be ack-
nowledged that organizations such as FIFA are composed of representati-
ves from different countries and with various political interests. The data 
necessary to conduct the research was collected from the digital archives 
of the FIFA Museum in Zurich, and included official FIFA press releases 
in particular. Additional data was collected from available publications.
Results
There are a number of ways in which ISOs such as FIFA might try to 
exert influence on governments, as well as a number of reasons for them 
to do so. It must be remembered, however, that such sports bodies tend to 
declare themselves politically neutral. In case of FIFA, political neutrality 
in one its principles (Eisenberg, 2005, p. 386). In the history of sport there 
have been numerous situations in which such organizations actually took 
a political position, for example in the case of two Chinas in international 
sport. Despite the desire to remain neutral, for example by not allowing 
the discussion of political issues during the FIFA Congress (Homburg, 
2006, p. 80), the decision to affiliate the national sport federation from 
one country or another has political and diplomatic significance of its 
own. Nevertheless, when it comes to FIFA’s attempts to influence state 
policy, it is usually aimed at stopping states from making political deci-
sions that affect sport, for example political bodies taking control over na-
tional sports federations. Another issue is related to human rights, since, 
on some occasions, the poor human rights record of a country has resulted 
in negative consequences for international sport. Sporting bodies such as 
FIFA are also capable of making states adopt particular laws, especially 
in relation to FIFA-controlled events that they want to host. Below, each 
of these issues will be analyzed.
As has been noted, FIFA as a non-governmental organization aims to 
be politically neutral, which is one of its principles. According to Article 4 
of the FIFA Statutes, discrimination of any kind, including regarding poli-
tical opinion, is strictly prohibited, while FIFA remains neutral in matters 
of politics and religion. The expectations regarding member associations 
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– the national football federations from various countries that are affilia-
ted to FIFA – are similar. According to Article 15 of the FIFA Statutes, 
they should remain independent and neutral in matters of politics and 
religion, and should avoid any form of political interference (FIFA, 2018, 
August, p. 7). These requirements also imply that states should refrain 
from exercising some of their authority and should honor the autonomy 
of sports federations operating in their countries.
The requirement from member organizations to remain politically 
neutral and autonomous is one of the main reasons why FIFA is able to 
actively exert influence on states. In its history, it has on numerous occa-
sions suspended these national associations as a result of external pressu-
re, usually governmental interference. This refers, for example, to the na-
tional federations of Azerbaijan (FIFA, 2003, April 4), Guatemala (FIFA, 
2004, January 9), Kenya (FIFA, 2004, June 2), Macau (2005, February 
15), Yemen (FIFA, 2005, August 12), Greece (FIFA, 2006, June 3), Iran 
(FIFA, 2006, November 23), Cameroon (FIFA, 2013, July 4), and Ni-
geria (FIFA, 2014, July 9). Of course, political interference is not the 
only reason for suspending national federations. For example, in 2011 
FIFA suspended the Football Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, un-
der Article 14 of the FIFA Statutes, because it did not adopt the Statutes 
according to the FIFA and UEFA requirements. This suspension meant 
the loss of all membership rights by this federation, including participa-
tion in international competitions (FIFA, 2011, April 1a). This situation 
was not purely political though. It was linked to the fact that the General 
Assembly of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation did not achieve the 
necessary quorum of support to adopt the Statutes (FIFA, 2011, April 1b). 
In the context of this research, the suspensions due to governmental inter-
ference are the most important.
In FIFA’s endeavors to protect the autonomy of its member associa-
tions, it is usually the national bodies that are directly affected – through 
their suspension. FIFA obviously does not have any power to exert direct 
pressure on governments, since formally they do not have any links. Still, 
usually, such suspensions soon lead to changes in government policy in 
line with FIFA’s expectations. As a result, the suspensions of national 
federations are usually lifted shortly after their imposition. For example, 
in the case of the suspension of Cameroon on July 4, 2013, it was lifted 
on July 22, 2013 after the normalization committee was appointed (FIFA, 
2013, July 22), while the suspension of Nigerian Football Federation in 
2014 was only in force for nine days (FIFA, 2014, July 18).
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As has been noted, in most cases there is no direct dialogue or ne-
gotiations between FIFA and governments and the whole discussion is 
held indirectly through the national federations. Nevertheless, on some 
occasions, discussions become more direct. For example, in 1999, FIFA 
ruled that that the suspension imposed by the Hungarian Government on 
the President of the Hungarian Football Federation must be lifted imme-
diately, or otherwise the federation would be suspended by FIFA. Shortly 
afterwards, the Hungarian Minister of Sport lifted the suspension (FIFA, 
1999, April 29). Another example took place in 2001, but can be traced 
back to 1999 when the Greek government proposed the National Sports 
Act, intended to give the state greater control over professional sport. The 
Hellenic Football Federation complained to FIFA (Garcia, Meier, 2013, 
p. 10), which decided that there was “past and ongoing governmental 
interference in the affairs of the Hellenic Football Federation” and requ-
ested the Greek government to immediately refrain from such activities 
and to amend the National Sports Act in order to ensure the independen-
ce and autonomy of the national federation. If those expectations were 
not met, FIFA threatened to suspend the Greek Federation (FIFA, 2001, 
March 20). Another example involved Spain. After its national team did 
not qualify to the 2008 Olympic Games, the Spanish government required 
its football federation to hold elections. FIFA President Joseph Blatter 
gave a press conference during his visit to Spain and suggested that FIFA 
Emergency Committee might suspend the Spanish Federation. In turn, 
when the Polish government suspended the board of its national football 
federation in response to its hesitant stance to sanction bribery and match 
fixing in 2007, FIFA and the European confederation UEFA demanded 
the removal of the government’s supervisors from the Polish Football Fe-
deration, suggesting that it risked suspension, withdrawal of Financial 
Assistance Programme payments and that Poland’s candidature to co-host 
the European Championships in 2012 would not be considered (Garcia, 
Meier, 2013, p. 18). In these cases, it could be observed that FIFA used an 
ultimatum instead of suspension to secure its objectives, but also that the-
re was more direct communication with national governments, which in 
both cases agreed with FIFA’s demands in order to avoid the suspension 
of their football federations.
As well as securing the autonomy of its member associations, in its hi-
story FIFA has also used its position to exert pressure on states concerning 
their human rights record. A classic example of this kind of diplomatic 
engagement by FIFA, and ISOs generally, relates to apartheid in South 
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Africa. FIFA suspended the South African Federation in 1963, and rein-
stated it only after the end of apartheid (Nygård, 2013, p. 240). Reference 
to human rights could also be observed concerning the recognition of na-
tional football federations. In light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, FIFA’s General Secretary and its future President Joseph 
Blatter declared that communities that acquired independence should not 
demand sporting recognition until they could “prove they can observe hu-
man rights” (Blatter, 1992, p. 1). It is not clear whether such declarations 
were actually executed, but what matters here is that FIFA was at least 
indirectly attempting to influence the governments of the new states. On 
the other hand, though, there have also been cases when FIFA actually 
ignored information regarding serious human rights violations. For exam-
ple, in 1973 it was reported that the military junta in Chile was using the 
national stadium as an internment camp and a venue for torturing political 
dissidents. The Soviet Union was supposed to play against Chile in World 
Cup qualifiers, so the Soviet officials requested the game was played in 
a neutral territory under those circumstances. FIFA sent a delegation to 
Chile, but on the grounds of declarations by Chilean officials it declined 
Soviet request (Sugden, Tomlinson, 1997, pp. 12–13). FIFA also granted 
the World Cup finals to Argentina and did not react to reported murders 
and torture of members of the political opposition by the ruling junta 
between 1976 and 1983 (Giulianotti, 2004, p. 359). This suggests FIFA’s 
selective attitude towards protecting human rights.
Another issue is related to the ability of international sports organi-
zations to convince states to amend their laws in line with their expecta-
tions. In the case of FIFA, this is strongly linked to its right to decide who 
can host football events under its jurisdiction, particularly the FIFA World 
Cup, which is regarded as a sporting mega-event. As a result, states ho-
sting such events make various legal concessions to FIFA. For example, 
before the FIFA World Cup in Russia in 2018, the Russian administration 
passed a number of exceptions to existing legislation, which stipulated 
changes to eight codes. These were designed to safeguard FIFA’s marke-
ting and sponsorship revenues, while others, for example, limited public 
gatherings during the event (Müller, 2017, p. 1126). By accepting such 
requests to amend legislation, governments obviously limit their own 
benefits from hosting sports events and in a way accept limitations of 
their sovereignty over their territories, but since they desire to host sports 
mega-events, inter alia for the sake of public diplomacy and nation bran-
ding, they are willing to accept these conditions.
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Discussion
There are a number of ways in which FIFA can try to exert influence 
on governments. First and foremost, it protects the autonomy of its mem-
ber associations, since on some occasions governments have attempted to 
increase their control over national bodies responsible for football. This mi-
ght happen through amending sports legislation or by suspending national 
football officials. Some of these activities might be justified by problems 
in the functioning of these federations. In such cases, FIFA usually reacts 
by either suspending these member associations or by threatening to do so. 
Although analyzing FIFA’s effectiveness in protecting the autonomy of its 
member federations was not the goal of this research, it appears that FIFA 
has been quite successful in this field. Suspensions, both threatened and 
implemented, that were examined in the research resulted in changes in 
governments’ policies in line with FIFA’s demands. Another way in which 
FIFA affects governments involves hosting football events under its con-
trol, such as the FIFA World Cup. States hosting such events are expected 
to amend their laws in order to better protect the interests of FIFA and its 
stakeholders, particularly in the field of protecting marketing rights. FIFA 
has also attempted to use its position in order to foster the protection of 
human rights, but its activity in this area has been inconsistent.
The processes by which non-governmental organizations are capable of 
changing states’ policies lead to the question of the reasons why sovereign 
states comply with their demands. An answer to this question is most pro-
bably connected to the global popularity of sport and, in this case, football. 
There are a number of potential benefits that a state or a government may 
gain from competing in international football or hosting football events. 
States which are successful in the Olympic Games and in international fo-
otball events are believed to increase their nation brands (Anholt, 2009, 
p. 24), while hosting sports mega-events is a typical public diplomacy tool 
(Nye, 2013, p. 570; Chalip, Costa, 2005, p. 125). The so-called ‘contested 
states’ are interested in simple participation in international sport, since 
membership of international sports bodies is regarded as a prerequisite of 
statehood (Keys, 2010, p. 259; Levermore, 2004, p. 21). The lack of the 
opportunity to compete in international sport may also pose an internal pro-
blem for a government, as it may by criticized by citizens disappointed by 
the inability of the teams from their country to compete internationally. As 
a result, states are not interested in confrontation with ISOs such as FIFA 
and in most cases decide to comply with FIFA’s expectations.
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The argument presented in this article is not to question states’ sovere-
ignty. Speaking of the activity of international sports organizations or sta-
tes’ participation in international sport as limitations to their sovereignty 
would be an exaggeration, since international sports organizations such as 
FIFA are not supranational institutions. They are non-governmental orga-
nizations which operate in the transnational arena. Governments simply 
decide to act in line with the expectations of actors such as FIFA. This is 
mostly due to their need to reach public diplomacy goals, since interna-
tional sport is a convenient medium for this purpose.
It is also important to point out that the diplomatic engagement of FIFA 
that was analyzed in the article is not the same as political engagement. 
In fact, the pressure exerted on governments was rather aimed at keeping 
politics out of sport. FIFA, like other international sports governing bo-
dies, officially declares neutrality and its functioning in practice appears 
to confirm this declaration. Of course, in some situations it simply had to 
take a political stance, as any decision would entail supporting the intere-
sts of one of the conflicting sides, such as in the case of the so-called Chi-
nese question in international sport; when the People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) both demanded to be the sole repre-
sentative of China in FIFA. Nevertheless, in the analyzed context, FIFA’s 
pressure exerted on states appeared to be free from political leanings.
Concluding remarks
The research conducted for this article indicated a number of ways in 
which FIFA was able to exert influence on governments. This led to the 
conclusion that international sports governing bodies such as FIFA are able 
to make the governments of sovereign states change their earlier decisions 
and policies, in line with its expectations. Not all attempts to influence sta-
tes by FIFA have been successful, but the fact that many of them resulted in 
a swift change of the state’s policy appears to verify the hypothesis stating 
that international sports governing bodies are diplomatic actors capable of 
influencing states, despite the fact that FIFA in most cases communicated 
with governments indirectly, through their member associations. It has also 
been observed that governments usually comply with the demands of inter-
national sports organizations because participation in international sport is 
important for states, as it enables the achievement of numerous external and 
internal objectives, particularly related to their national image.
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Międzynarodowe organizacje sportowe jako aktorzy dyplomatyczni.  
Przypadek FIFA wywierającej wpływ na państwa 
 
Streszczenie
Współczesna dyplomacja przyjmuje coraz bardziej sieciową formę, co objawia 
się zaangażowaniem nowych aktorów, w tym międzynarodowych organizacji spor-
towych. Artykuł poświęcony jest zagadnieniu dyplomacji sportowej organizacji 
sportowych kontrolujących międzynarodową rywalizację sportową, na przykładzie 
Międzynarodowej Federacji Piłki Nożnej (FIFA). Badanie, którego dotyczy artykuł, 
stanowi studium przypadku poświęcone kwestii wywierania przez międzynarodową 
organizację sportową nacisku na rządy suwerennych państw, na przykładzie FIFA. 
Celem badania jest sprawdzenie czy organizacje sportowe są w stanie sprawić, aby 
rządy zmieniły swoje decyzje polityczne. Hipoteza, która została poddana weryfikacji 
zakłada, iż międzynarodowe organizacje sportowe są podmiotami dyplomatycznymi 
zdolnymi wpływać na państwa.
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